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1 Introduction
Economists have recently pointed out that wealth, and especially inherited wealth, is
becoming increasingly important in many industrialized countries. In the UK, the richest
10 percent of households own more than ten times the average for all households and
almost five times as much wealth as the bottom half put together (Mirrlees et al 2011:
350). Some of this difference is a result of individuals being at different stages in life,
but there is also substantial wealth inequality within each age group. Since those with
more wealth to begin with are also more likely to inherit themselves, gift and inheritances
may reinforce and strengthen the inequality over time. There is no consensus in literature
regarding taxation of wealth transfers, however, and international practice differs widely.
While some countries taxes both gifts and inheritances, others only tax transfers at death
or do not tax transfers at all. And the political debate is heated. What supporters regard
as a necessary tool for redistribution and key to achieving equality of opportunity, is
by opponents viewed as an unjustified confiscation of family property by the state. In
Norway, the new right-wing government has already abolished the inheritance tax and is
announcing a gradual abolishment of the wealth tax as well.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a comprehensive tax base was introduced in
all developed countries. The progressive tax schedule applied to the base of both labor
and capital income was mainly explained by an ability to pay argument (Piketty and Saez,
2014). Most of the highest income flows were capital, and many countries taxed capital
income more heavily than labor income during the interwar period. At the same time
as a number of countries instituted tax surcharges for capital income, steeply progressive
inheritance taxes were introduced to limit the wealth inequality across generations. From
1980 and onwards however, almost all developed countries experienced a decline in tax
progressivity. The substantial reduction in top tax rates for both income and bequests
flows in combination with countries excluding a growing fraction of capital income from
the tax base turned the progressive income tax into more of a progressive labor income
tax. How do we explain this tendency? It could be that the decline in inherited wealth,
a relative rise of life-cycle wealth and a compression of wealth inequality called for a
different taxation. According to Piketty and Saez this can only be part of the answer,
since the low inheritance flows in the 1950s and 1960s represent a temporary decline due
to war shocks and inheritance flows now seem to be increasing.
In a very influential paper, Piketty (2011) finds that inherited wealth is of increasing
importance in France. He describes a U-shaped pattern in the long-run development of
inheritance flows. Inheritance made up 20-25 percent of national income in the beginning
of the twentieth century, fell below 10 percent in the interwar period and hit bottom
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at 5 percent in the 1950s before they started rising again. Piketty reports the 2008
inheritance flow in France to be close to 15 percent, and predicts an inheritance-income
ratio of 15-20 percent in the coming decades. Two driving factors in this development
are the relative ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living, and the wealth-
income ratio. In periods with high economic growth, wealth of the past is weakened and
inheritances as share of national income decreases. As soon as growth declines, however,
the wealth inherited from one’s parents and grandparents strengthens its significance and
may end up dominating new wealth. Following Piketty, Atkinson (2013) uses British data
to see whether the sharp rise in wealth-income ratio in the UK has led to a corresponding
increase in the wealth being passed on from one generation to the next. He finds a similar
pattern to that in France, though less accentuated - in 2006, the inheritance flow in the
UK reached 8,2 percent.
In this thesis I investigate whether inheritances are of increasing importance in Norway
as well. With an economic growth that has been less affected by the financial crisis than
in most other countries and a relative high population growth, we would expect the
inheritance to income ratio to be lower in Norway than in France and much of continental
Europe. The fact that Norway, in addition to France, is one of few countries that until
recently had a tax on wealth transfers provides us with a valuable data source on the
development of inheritances over time. Up until abolishment, the inheritance tax was
widely unpopular. An important argument for abolishing the inheritance tax was that it
collected very little revenue - in fact, some even nicknamed the inheritance tax a “voluntary
tax” or a “tax on sudden death”. It was considered inefficient and unfair, since the very
wealthy could easily avoid it by tax planning whereas the less wealthy whose main asset
was housing were unable to tax plan. As part of my analysis I try to estimate to what
extent the very wealthy were able to diminish their wealth before death. I separate the
population based on wealth to see whether there are any differences between the wealthiest
and the less wealthy when it comes to development of wealth during the last stages of
life. Finally, I will use the framework of Piketty (2011) and the estimated degree of tax
avoidance to calculate alternative measures of the development of the inheritance-income
ratio over time in Norway.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I start with the theoretical back-
ground for taxing wealth transfers. Section 3 describes the development of wealth and
inheritances in Norway. In section 4, I examine the inheritance tax planning behavior
among Norwegians. Section 5 imputes the inheritance flow in Norway from 1998 to 2012,
replicating Piketty’s exercise. Section 6 concludes.
2
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Why do people leave bequests?
There are mainly two explanations for the existence of bequests. One states that bequests
are accidental, the other that bequests are planned. Different theories of what motivates
intentional bequests exist, and these motives are of great importance for the impact of
wealth transfers taxation on efficiency, equity and economic behavior.
The permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) claims that households’ consump-
tion is based on the present discounted value of lifetime income. We look at a consumer
with initial assets A0 and preferences
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct)
where 0 < β < 1 , ct is consumption and the period utility function u(.) is increasing,
strictly concave and twice differentiable. The consumer’s budget constraint is
At+1 = (1 + r)(At − ct + yt)
where r is the one-period interest rate, Yt is labor income in period t and A{t+1} is
investment in assets yielding payoff in period t + 1. Assuming that the no-Ponzi scheme
condition holds,
limt→∞ At(1+r)t = 0
the intertemporal budget constraint can be formulated as
∑∞
t=0
Ct
(1+r)t
= A0 +
∑∞
t=0
Yt
(1+r)t
This condition tells us that net present value of consumption must equal net present value
of income plus initial assets. In optimum,
u′(Ct)
βu′(Ct+1)
= 1 + r
such that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative price
of goods in the next period measured in units of present goods. If individuals have
preferences for full consumption smoothing,
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β = 1
1+r
consumption is constant across periods, Ct = Ct+1 = C. Individuals will in each period
consume a constant fraction of of permanent income;
C = ( r
1+r
)[A0 +
∑∞
t=0
Yt
(1+r)t
]
Like the permanent income hypothesis, the life-cycle hypothesis pioneered by Modigliani
and Brumberg (1954) establishes that individuals make consumption decisions based on
the total resources available to them over lifetime. Consumption is thus smoothed across
periods of various income levels. Holdings of wealth during lifetime are predicted to have
an inverted U-pattern. While young, individuals borrow against future income. Once
they start working, they repay their debt and save for retirement so that they can finance
consumption during the last stage of life by dissaving acquired assets. Since all wealth
accumulation happens to finance future consumption, aggregate savings in the economy
will in a pure life-cycle model remain zero unless there is population or productivity
growth. With a growing population, the total savings of young exceeds total dissaving
of old and aggregate savings are positive. Under productivity growth, each successive
generation is wealthier than the preceeding and thus has a higher consumption. Since
each cohort raise their savings relative to previous cohorts to finance increasing expenses
also during retirement, the result is positive savings. Empirically though, the pure life-
cycle model assumption of dissaving during the last stages of life does not seem to fit.
One explanation for this could be precautionary savings among the elderly. By extending
the model to include uncertainty and imperfect capital markets, also bequests can be
accounted for. When individuals face uncertainty regarding length of lifetime and credit
markets are incomplete, their savings acts like a buffer against living too long or facing
large expenses in old age. Bequests are left whenever individuals die with positive savings.
Since these bequests are simply a result of uncertainty and credit market imperfections,
they are called accidental.
Another explanation for the lack of dissaving among retired individuals, supported by
the large number of wealth transfers during life, is that bequests are intentional. Barro
(1974) and Becker (1974) describe an altruistic bequest motive, where parents deliberately
transfer wealth to their children. Altruistic parents care about the lifetime utility of their
children and yield direct utility from each child’s welfare. To maximize utility, parents
typically leave different amounts to different children in order to equalize their incomes.
Usually, children with lower earnings receive higher bequests than children with higher
earnings. Alternatively, the parents might transfer more resources to their wealthier
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children if their expected payoff is higher (NOU 2000:8 Arveavgift).
Related to altruistic donors are the parents motivated by the “warm glow” they receive
from giving. This “warm glow” or “joy of giving” motive was explained by Andreoni
(1989) and is similar to altruism in that the testators transfer wealth without expecting
anything in return. However, children’s needs are not taken into account. This motive
is more selfish than the altruistic and the distribution of wealth is unimportant. Leaving
bequests is motivated by the donor’s joy of giving, and the utility of the recipient is of
inferior importance. Transferring wealth therefore compares to any other consumption,
and the donor’s utility is maximized when marginal utility of giving equals marginal utility
of consumption.
A third group of motives are the strategic bequests, described by Bernheim, Shleifer
and Summers (1985). Strategic exchange happens when children offer assistance and
services in return for payments in form of bequests. Children could offer plain market
goods (like household work, driving etc) or more personal services like visits and attention
(Gale and Slemrod, 2000). Parents use bequests as payment for affecting the recipients’
behavior. The transfer works similar to a market exchange. Parents could either pay
their children from time to time, or delay payment until death to assure lifelong atten-
tion. Strategic bequests depend on the wealth and the needs of the donor, and are not
necessarily equalized across recipients.
The literature also describes a fourth motive, where substantial wealth is assumed
to provide utility beyond the consumption this wealth could finance. In this capitalistic
model utility is gained from the status, power or social connections a large amount of
wealth might imply. Wealth in itself generates utility through all periods of life, and
might even create utility beyond death since very wealthy individuals may choose to
continue living in the public arena through trust funds or foundations (Kley, 2012). Even
if this kind of motive only applies to a small group of individuals, it is important for policy
since these individuals leave behind a large share of total bequests.
2.2 Taxation of wealth transfers
When designing taxes, one always wants to achieve efficiency so that distortions are
minimized and revenue secured. The efficiency considerations must then be traded off
with equity concerns, for many the main reason to levy taxes. Also administrative costs
must be taken into account. Inheritance tax design is not as simple as it might sound,
however. The tradeoff between efficiency and equity is not clear-cut, but depends on
something (according to some) as non-economic as norms and ethics. Even if agreeing on
the importance of equity, pursuing equity means different things to different people. In
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addition, the underlying bequest motives are of crucial importance for policy implications.
Before I continue, I would like to make two distinctions when it comes to wealth
transfers and taxation of those. A wealth transfer can either happen between living
individuals (inter-vivos) or at death. Since inter-vivos are more likely to be planned,
there might be a case for taxing these differently than transfers at death. The fact
that motives are unobservable makes is difficult to separate the two types of transfers.
Moreover, motive is not a relevant consideration when considering equity and equality of
opportunity issues (Boadway et al 2010: 773). When discussing taxation of bequests in
the following sections, I therefore assume that both gifts and inheritances are included
in the tax base so that each recipient pays tax on total wealth transfers received during
lifetime. My second distinction regards the fact that different countries apply different
tax bases. A tax on wealth transfers is either donor based (called estate tax) or recipient
based (called inheritance tax). Logically, the donor based tax is based on the estate
left by the deceased, while a recipient based system is based on the amount received by
the recipient. I will in this thesis concentrate on inheritance taxation, if not otherwise
specified.
2.2.1 Efficiency
Efficiency in the commodity market is distorted by the fact that leisure is nontaxable. On
pure efficiency grounds, optimal tax theory recommend taxing complements of leisure at
a higher rate than other goods to reduce this inefficiency (Corlett and Hague, 1953). An
inheritance tax will clearly affect the choice between consuming and bequeathing. But
even if distorting the lifetime consumption - inheritance choice, Kaplow (2001) argues that
there is no place for an estate tax in an optimal tax structure based on efficiency con-
siderations without evidence about the relative complementarity of lifetime consumption
versus inheritance with respect to leisure.
A tax has an efficiency cost if it changes the behavior of individuals or firms compared
to their conduct in absence of taxation. From an efficiency perspective, accidental bequests
thus seem like highly attractive subjects of taxation since they have noe effect on the
donor’s behavior. The problem is that distinguishing accidental bequests from intentional
ones is almost impossible. Before arguing that taxing wealth at death is a good idea
since death itself is inevitable, one should remember that estate or inheritance taxation
is a tax on wealth transfers rather than a death tax (Gale and Slemrod, 2000). Even
though individuals cannot escape death, behavioral response concerning accumulation
and distribution of wealth before death are absolutely relevant and must be taken into
account. And even if taxing an accidental bequest would be highly efficient due to the
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lack of tax planning by the donor, it would create a loss for the recipient who is now worse
off than without the tax.
Since optimal taxation depends on how both donor and recipient are affected by the
tax, transfer motives are central. Under an altruistic bequest motive, the transfer yields
value to both donor and recipient. If allowing for such double-counting, welfarists1 would
argue that altruistic bequests should be taxed more heavily than others. Others might
consider the donor’s utility gain as a positive externality connected to an altruistically
given bequest and thus suggest subsidizing the bequest rather than taxing it. In any
case, double-taxing the transfer would probably not be a good idea since then everything
else yielding utility to the recipient (and thereby the donor) should also be taxed twice.
Assume that your child gets a wage increase and that you are very happy for her. Should
the utility increase you get from her higher earnings result in a higher tax burden? The
tax system can obviously not take such utility interdependency into account (Boadway
et al 2010: 771). It is interesting to note that from a welfarist’s perspective, accidental
bequests should actually be subject to lower taxation since they only yield utility to the
recipient.
Some would argue that strategic bequests should be taxed more heavily than others
since they represent a transaction similar to any other market exchange. Such a tax would
compare to a VAT on market goods. “Double taxation” is often heard in the inheritance
tax debate as an argument against taxation. People seem to forget that this phenomenon
already exists in various forms in our economies. VAT is one example of double taxation,
since individuals buy goods out of already taxed incomes. Allowing VAT on most other
goods and services, one would think that double taxing strategic bequests should be
feasible. Just as the elasticity of substitution is important when taxing other goods, the
elasticity of parent’s demand for their children’ services would in this case be important
for the inheritance tax rate (Gale and Slemrod, 2000). A low elasticity of demand would
allow for a high optimal tax rate on strategic bequests.
This section suggests that the efficiency implications of an inheritance tax would be
unclear even if bequest motives were observable. Knowing that motives are difficulty to
observe and likely to vary across givers and types of transfers (ibid), it is hardly surprising
that there is no consensus in literature when it comes to optimal taxation of bequests.
1Under welfarism, the objective of the government is to choose a tax structure that maximizes social
welfare when behavioral responses and revenue requirements are taken into account. Often social welfare
is represented by summing over individuals’ utilities. Under standard assumptions of positive, diminishing
marginal utility a transfer from a wealthier person to a less wealthy person yields a utility gain to the
poorer individual that outweighs the loss of utility for the wealthier person.
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2.2.2 Equity
The famous 80-20 debate displays different theories of the role of bequests in total wealth
accumulation that are of great importance for the redistributive effects of inheritance
taxation. Kotlikoff and Summers (1980) started by claiming that 80 percent of wealth is
related to bequests, and that only the remaining 20 is a result of life cycle accumulation.
Modigliani (1986) replied, defending his life cycle hypothesis by arguing the exact oppo-
site: that 80 percent of an individual’s wealth can be attributed to life cycle accumulation.
This huge discrepancy in results is partly due to how the authors take different transfers
into account when estimating (Pestieau, 2003). While Modigliani considers only inher-
itance and major gifts between independent households, Kotlikoff and Summers add all
transfers received above 18 years of age. Moreover, Modigliani considers the sum of trans-
fers in real terms, whereas Kotlikoff and Summers include also the accumulated interest
on transfers. Davies and Shorrocks (2000) suggest that 20-30 percent of total wealth can
be attributed to bequests when bequests are not capitalized, while the share increases to
40-50 percent for capitalized bequests.
Studies for France and Sweden indicate that European countries might have a greater
share of inherited wealth relative to the US. Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) find that inherited
wealth of households as a fraction of total wealth in Sweden in 1981 was 51 percent,
compared to a 19 percent share in the US using similar data and computations. Kessler
and Masson (1989) look at France and estimate that a uniform reduction in bequests
would lower total savings by 35-40 percent. The conclusion by Pestieau (2003) is that
growing and more private economies like the US seem to have a higher share of aggregate
wealth associated with lifetime accumulation.
It is common to divide equity considerations into vertical and horizontal perspectives.
According to Musgrave (1990), vertical equity is “calling for an appropriate differentiation
of unequals”. When estimating vertical equity effects of a tax reform one compares the
tax treatment of those with higher income or wealth to those with less. Vertical equity
improves with tax progressivity. Gale and Slemrod (2000) argue that the case for pro-
gressivity in inheritance taxation is strengthened by a large increase in the concentration
of before-tax income and wealth. They report that tax liability is the US is extraordinar-
ily concentrated among high-wealth owners, no matter whether taxation is based on the
donor or the recipient. In 1997, more than 99 percent of the US estate tax burden fell
on the top quintile (ibid). When studying the redistributive effects of taxation, however,
one must compare the outcome under taxation to that in the absence of taxation. Under
pure altruism, intergenerational transfers are expected to have a smoothing effect across
generations, thereby reducing vertical inequity (Masson and Pestieau 1997:76). Bequests
are also used to smooth wealth across children. Taxing transfers in an altruistic world
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could therefore strengthen vertical inequity, by discouraging bequests. However, under
altruism one faces an important trade-off between wealth differences across and within
families. Even if harming vertical equity, taxation of bequests could be a tool in reducing
horizontal inequity if the intragenerational differences are large, and substantial transfers
within altruistic families create wealth dynasties.
Horizontal equity demands an equal treatment of equal individuals, and is said to be
violated by reforms that alter the pre-reform ranking of individuals by income or utility
levels (Kaplow, 1989). If strategic parents favor time or help from one child, or one
of the children has less capacity to look after his parents, taxation of transfers would
improve horizontal equity by reducing the incentives to treat siblings differently (Masson
and Pestieau 1997:78). At the same time, horizontal equity could be argued to decline
under an inheritance tax since otherwise equal individuals are discriminated based on
their preferences. From the perspective of the decedent, inheritance taxation punishes
altruistic families and gain selfish ones and generosity towards the next generation is
discouraged. From the perspective of the next generation however, wealth transfers itself
harms horizontal equity. One popular criterion for evaluating tax reforms is the equality
of opportunity perspective. The interpretation by Roemer (1998) is that individuals
should be compensated for disadvantages they are endowed with, but should otherwise
be free to exercise their choices according to their own preferences. According to this
view, any intergenerational transfer that enhances the opportunities of a recipient should
be included in her tax base. Letting children be punished because their parents spend
money on themselves rather than save for the next generation does seem to violate fair play
(Gale and Slemrod, 2000). But once we allow for regulating differences in opportunities
that come in the form of wealth transfers, we discriminate between different transfers
from parents to children. What about other investments parents do to better equip their
children? Should not human capital differences arising from time with parents, help etc.
also be included in the tax base? What about gifts received as a child? Advocates of
the tax might reply that inheritance is a civic rather than natural right, and that the
government has the duty to regulate it (ibid).
An argument posted by Stiglitz (1978) is that inheritance taxation might have an
adverse effect on wealth distribution. If the tax reduces personal savings so that capital
accumulation decreases, the return to capital will increase relative to wages such that
wealth inequality increases. Unless the capital accumulation is too high and taxing it is
desirable (Masson and Pestieau, 1997:80), removing inheritance taxes will improve equity.
Because of the widely different views of what is considered right and wrong, it seems
impossible to draw a conclusion regarding equity issues. The fact that policy implications
hinge on bequest motives, further complicates the question. The trade-off between wealth
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differences across and within families, however, is important. Following the discussion of
Masson and Pestieau (1997), in an altruistic world the case for taxation of transfers is
strengthened when between-family wealth differences are larger than within families, and
the efficiency cost of public redistribution is not much higher than that of private redis-
tribution. This trade-off only applies to altruists. For other types, Masson and Pestieau
argue that taxation of transfers is always desirable from a redistributive perspective.
2.2.3 Costs of taxation
The administrative convenience is probably one of the reasons that estate and inheritance
taxation date back for centuries (Gale and Slemrod, 2000). The probate process reveals
information about assets that are otherwise difficult to obtain, and collection costs are low
since information is already registered. Even if administrative costs are relatively small,
however, the costs in form of tax planning and tax evasion might be substantial. Actually,
the tax has been called voluntary due to the many avoidance opportunities (ibid).
There are two types of costs related to taxation of wealth transfers. Administrative
costs come from operating, monitoring and enforcing the system, while compliance costs
are related to tax avoidance and tax planning. While estimating the actual compliance
costs are challenging, the dimensions of avoidance and evasion are important both from an
equity and efficiency perspective. Clearly, tax avoidance reduces efficiency by shrinking
the net revenue. Also vertical equity might suffer under taxation. One of the main
critiques against inheritance taxation when inter-vivos are not included in the tax base is
that it harms the middle classes and gains the very wealthy. Whereas the very richest to a
great extent can avoid the inheritance tax by transferring significant proportions of their
wealth during lifetime, individuals whose main asset is owner-occupied housing are not
able to tax plan (Mirrlees et al, 2011). If the very wealthiest might avoid the inheritance
tax altogether, the tax becomes regressive.
2.3 How do bequests develop over time?
Piketty (2011) explains the U-shaped development of the inheritance flow in France over
the last two centuries using a simple theoretical model of wealth accumulation, growth and
inheritance. In the 1800s, growth was low and old (inherited) wealth made up a substantial
fraction of national income. Saving a small share of asset returns was sufficient to ensure
that inherited wealth grew at least as fast as national income. When old wealth was
capitalized faster than national income, the aggregate inheritance-income ratio increased.
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A simple r > g logic implies that the capital shocks during and between the two world
wars combined with exceptional growth rates in the post-war period led to a decline in
the inheritance flows. With the recovery of asset prices and the low growth in the 1980s
and 90s however, the trend was reversed and inheritance flows returned towards previous
levels.
It is not obvious that the same pattern is present in other countries than France.
Piketty argues that a U-shape should be found in continental European countries that
were hit by similar growth and capital shocks. Atkinson’s (2013) paper on the long-run
development of inheritance flows in the UK supports this theory. UK, who was hit by
the same mid-century fall in asset prices but did not experience war destruction to the
same extent, experienced a U-shape that is less pronounced. Regardless of what shocks
a country is exposed to, the same logic applies. In countries with large economic and/or
demographic growth rates, like China or India, inheritance will only make up a small
fraction of national income. On the contrary, low-growth countries like Spain or Italy will
face increasing inheritance flows.
What about Norway? Compared to other European countries, Norway is often an
outsider. The economic growth has been less affected by the financial crisis than in most
other countries, and the demographic growth is relatively high. Applying the r > g logic,
the inheritance flow in Norway today is expected to be lower than in France and much of
continental Europe.
3 The development of wealth and inheritances in Nor-
way
3.1 Official inheritance statistics
Norway is one of few countries that for a long time taxed both inheritances (wealth
transfers) and wealth itself. On January 1st 2014, the inheritance tax was abolished.
However, the fact that such a tax has been operative provides us with a valuable data
source on the development of inheritances over time. And in contrast with other countries
that must rely on self-reported data in small sample surveys, these data cover the whole
population.
In the official inheritance statistics published by Statistics Norway, we find data on
aggregate inheritances and gifts subject to taxation. In Table 1 these sizes are reported for
the period 1997-2011, together with the average size of inheritances and inter-vivos gifts
per recipient. The size of average registered inheritances and gifts are overall increasing,
but there is no apparent trend over time. The table has one major drawback. Since
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it shows only the gifts and inheritances subject to taxation, changes in the thresholds
of tax exemptions and tax rates are causing jumps in the average transfers (see section
2.2 Overview of Norwegian inheritance tax law and tax rules). When only tax liable
transfers are registered, an increase in threshold for tax exempt gifts and inheritances
will necessarily lead to an increase in the average reported transfer, and a decrease in the
number of tax liable transfers. What at first glance might look as a massive increase in
average inheritances and gifts from 1998 to 2011 is therefore mostly driven by changes in
thresholds. Thus, the results from year to year are not comparable.
Table 1: Inheritances and gifts subject to taxation in Norway 1997 – 2011
Registered Registered Recipients Recipients Average Average
Year inheritances gifts inheritances gifts inheritance gift
mill NOK mill NOK mill NOK mill NOK
1997 9769 5114 21683 9648 0,4505 0,5300
1998 10698 3509 23499 7632 0,4552 0,4597
1999 10438 4412 14683 6319 0,7109 0,6982
2000 11302 5043 16069 7095 0,7033 0,7108
2001 12346 4942 17832 7229 0,6923 0,6836
2002 13194 4892 19297 7202 0,6837 0,6793
2003 12128 5781 15427 7071 0,7861 0,8176
2004 13482 6682 16394 7797 0,8224 0,8571
2005 15116 10660 17856 11807 0,8466 0,9029
2006 14783 7443 17359 8888 0,8516 0,8374
2007 18004 9387 20415 10346 0,8819 0,9074
2008 14065 6630 18977 7422 0,7412 0,8933
2009 18260 8291 12955 6056 1,4095 1,3690
2010 19274 8610 13574 6262 1,4199 1,3750
2011 20601 9585 15252 6967 1,3507 1,3758
2011
1997
2,11 1,87 0,70 0,72 3,00 2,60
Sources: Statistics Norway (2013) and Statistics Norway (2000). All values measured in 2012 prices.
Since I could not rely on the inheritance tax statistics to find out if there is a general
increase in size of average inheritances and gifts over time, I was lucky to find data
covering also tax exempt transfers. In Table 2, both tax liable and tax exempt gifts and
inheritances are included. Comparing Table 1 and 2, we see that the overall increase is
similar for both types of transfers. Even if the increase in average gifts and inheritances
decrease when we include tax-exempt transfers, we still see a doubling from 1997 to 2011.
While average gifts are steadily increasing during the period, inheritances are actually
decreasing from 2009. Much of the decrease can be explained by an increase in the
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number receiving inheritances, and some might be explained as normalization after the
large jump in aggregate inheritances from 2008 to 2009.
In 2009, both inheritance tax rates and thresholds for tax liability changed. The jumps
in average gifts and inheritances in 2009 correspond to the changes in thresholds that year
(see Table 3). Looking at gifts, one might suggest that individuals respond to inheritance
tax incentives by maximizing their transfers up to the threshold for tax liability. In fact,
the average gift given in 2009-2011 is extremely close to the threshold for tax exemptions
(NOK 470 000). In the case of inheritances, the jump in 2009 raises average transfer value
from almost exactly the second tax rate threshold in 2008 to a little above the new surtax
threshold in 2009. The reduction in tax rates in 2009 is also likely to have increased
inheritances and gifts (see Table 3).
Table 2: All registered inheritances and gifts in Norway 1997 - 2011
Total Total Recipients Recipients Average Average
Year inheritances gifts inheritances gifts inheritance gift
mill NOK mill NOK NOK NOK
1997 11414 7395 43795 30460 260620 242773
1998 12210 5613 46456 26685 262837 210349
1999 13879 9124 41816 34435 331906 264965
2000 14392 9565 40048 33944 359356 281779
2001 15158 9320 39495 32444 383802 287278
2002 15622 9258 38124 32364 409772 286044
2003 15118 11451 34123 36975 443051 309701
2004 16175 12452 32619 37889 495881 328633
2005 17461 17739 33074 51338 527935 345541
2006 16731 13178 29982 37644 558049 350073
2007 21209 16652 35823 45061 592039 369545
2008 17237 12326 31367 34744 549514 354754
2009 23360 18529 28789 39680 811413 466955
2010 25207 18213 33285 37920 757294 480294
2011 28757 19705 53765 40590 534863 485461
2011
1997
2,52 2,66 1,23 1,33 2,05 2,00
Sources: Inheritance register, Statistics Norway. All values measured in 2012 prices.
3.2 Overview of Norwegian inheritance law2 and tax rules
In Norway, there are three groups of inheritors. The first group is lineal descendants
(livsarvinger), i.e. children, grandchildren and great grandchildren of the deceased. The
2Overview of inheritance law is following The Inheritance Act (1972).
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second group is the deceased’s parents and their descendants, accordingly the deceased’s
siblings, siblings’ children and grandchildren. The third group is the deceased’s grand-
parents and their children and grandchildren, which means uncles, aunts and cousins of
the deceased. If the deceased leaves inheritors in one group, the estate is not distributed
to successive groups. Inheritors in the second (third) group will therefore not inherit as
long as there are any inheritors in the first (first or second) group. Within each group, the
estate is distributed equally to inheritors with the same family relation to the deceased. If
the deceased had four children, they each inherit the same amount. If one or more of the
children are dead, their children will inherit the portion otherwise received by the parent.
If there are no inheritors in the first group but both parents are alive, each parent inherits
the same amount. If only one parent is alive, half of the estate goes to that parent and
the other half goes to lineal descendants of the other parent.
If the deceased was married, his or her share of the common property and any separate
property will be distributed. If the deceased leaves children or grandchildren, the surviving
spouse inherits one fourth of the deceased’s estate but at least four times the base rate
G3 . If the deceased leaves no lineal descendants but inheritors in the second group, the
spouse inherits half of the deceased’s estate, and at least six times the base rate. From
01.05.2013, the base rate is NOK 85 245, meaning that 4G is equivalent to NOK 340
980, and 6G is equivalent to 511 470. If the deceased leaves a spouse and all inheritors
are in the third group, the surviving spouse inherits everything. The spouse may retain
an undivided life estate (uskiftet bo) in marital property that is not distributed until
the surviving spouse dies. In this case, the surviving spouse does not inherit from the
deceased spouse. If the deceased had children from other relationships, these heirs may
claim their share of the inheritance before the surviving spouse dies.
In Norway, the spouse or children cannot be disinherited even if the deceased leaves a
written will. Up to a maximum of 1 mill NOK for each child of each parent, the children
may claim a minimum inheritance of 2/3 of what the parent leaves behind. If the deceased
leaves no spouse or inheritors and no written will, the State inherits everything.
The first regulation of inheritance in Denmark-Norway came in 1792. In the beginning,
gifts were tax exempt and lineal descendants were not included in the tax base. First in
the beginning of the twentieth century were inter-vivos taxed, and transfers to children
tax liable. In the interwar period, tax rates increased dramatically and the differences in
rates between groups of recipients were large. From 1940 to the present law of 1965 the
inheritance tax rates reached their highest levels. From 1965, the rates gradually declined
and the differences between groups were reduced. In the period I look at in this thesis,
there are only two groups of inheritors and the gap between tax rates is small. In Table
3G is the annual “basic amount” (grunnbeløp) in social security.
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3 above, I have listed the inheritance tax rates applying to the two groups of inheritors
from 1998 - 2012.
Table 3: Inheritance tax rates and thresholds 1998-2012
Year Group Exempts 1. level 2.level
1998 0 - 100 000 100 - 400 000 400 000 -
Children, foster children, parents 0 percent 8 percent 10 percent
Others 0 percent 20 percent 30 percent
1999 0 - 200 000 200 - 500 000 500 000 -
Children, foster children, parents 0 percent 8 percent 10 percent
Others 0 percent 20 percent 30 percent
2003 0 - 250 000 250 - 550 000 550 000 -
Children, foster children, parents 0 percent 8 percent 10 percent
Others 0 percent 20 percent 30 percent
2009 0 - 470 000 470 - 800 000 800 000 -
Children, foster children, parents 0 percent 6 percent 8 percent
Others 0 percent 10 percent 15 percent
Sources: Skatteetaten (2014a) and NOU 2000:8 (2000).
Before the inheritance tax was abolished from 01.01.2014, most gifts and inheritances
were subject to taxation. Exceptions were inheritance to surviving spouses and spousal
equivalents4 and receivers with objective of public utility. The Norwegian inheritance
taxation was recipient based, meaning that the total gift and inheritance received by one
individual from one donor constituted the tax base. In comparison, under estate taxation
it is the total estate left by the deceased that makes up the tax base. Inter-vivos given to
lineal descendants of the donor or donor’s spouse/spousal equivalent and receivers men-
tioned in the written will at the time of transfer were subject to taxation. Gifts to lineal
descendants or spouse/spousal equivalent of lineal descendants of other recipients and
gifts to companies, trusts or foundations in which any of the above-mentioned had inter-
ests were also tax liable. Any gift transferred within the last six months of a donor’s life
was tax liable, independent of recipient. If the recipient or its spouse/spousal equivalent
were mentioned in the written will, inter-vivos given within the last five years were tax
liable. Interest-free loans, benefits of a loan with below-market interest rate, debt release
and sales below market value were all included in the gift conception. Annual amounts
up to 0.5 G were tax exempt.
4Spousal equivalents are unmarried cohabitants that have or used to have children together, or used
to be married. Also unmarried cohabitants living in partnership for at least two years continuously count
as spousal equivalents.
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In Table 3 we see that there were two thresholds applying to both groups between
1998 and 2012, one separating tax exempt from tax liable tax transfers (level 1) and
one separating transfers subject to lower taxation from those more heavily taxed (level
2). From 1998 to 2008, the first tax level was 8 percent for children, foster children
and parents whereas it was 20 percent for others. Above the second threshold children,
foster children and parents paid 10 percent tax, while others paid 30 percent. In 2009,
the tax rates were lowered to 6 and 8 percent for children, foster children and parents,
and to 10 and 15 percent for others. The thresholds for tax liability changed in 1998,
1999, 2003 and 2009. Both the changes in tax rates and thresholds affect the official
inheritance tax statistics and make it difficult to interpret. The reduction in tax rates in
2009 clearly had an impact on incentives to transfers, and explains some of the increase
in both average and aggregate inheritances this year. But the changes in thresholds are
what really complicate the statistics. In 1998, the first NOK 100 000 of an inheritance
were tax exempt. In 2009, the exempted amount had increased to NOK 470 000. The
threshold for the inheritance “surtax” doubled within the same period, from NOK 400 000
to NOK 800 000. Let us take inheritances in 1999 as an example. This year, NOK 200 000
was tax exempt. We know that the number of individuals receiving (taxable) inheritances
in 1999 was 14683. Each of these individuals received NOK 200 000 without having to
pay taxes, which means that inheritances around NOK 3 000 000 000 were not registered
in the inheritance tax statistics. Then we have all individuals receiving NOK 200 000
or less. From the population statistics (Statistics Norway 2014a) we know that 45 170
individuals died in 1999. If we assume that the deceased left inheritances to on average
4 recipients each, around 166 0005 were left with inheritances less than or equal to NOK
200 000. If the average bequest received by those was NOK 100 000, another NOK 16 600
000 000 escaped the inheritance tax register. The fact that tax exempted inheritances are
not registered would not be a problem if the thresholds remained the same. In that case,
total inheritances would be higher than reported in the inheritance statistics each year
but the change in aggregate inheritance flow would be unaffected. Since the first threshold
increased by 370 percent during the period 1998-2012, it is obvious that the inheritance
statistics from year to year are not comparable. Since inheritances up to NOK 470 000
were tax exempt in 2009-2013, the non-registered bequests in this period are likely to
make up a much larger share of total inheritances than in 1998 when the threshold for
tax exemptions was NOK 100 000.
We saw in Table 1 that taxable aggregate inheritances doubled from 1999 to 2011.
Including tax exempt inheritances, the increase is 150 percent. The actual increase is
514683/4=3670,75 individuals leaving inheritances >= NOK 200 000. This means that the recipients
of the 45170-3671=41499 deceased were left with less than NOK 200 000. In total 41499*4=165996
recipients.
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therefore higher than what it seems like in the official inheritance statistics, but disguised
by the changes in tax exempted amounts. At the same time, the reduction in tax rates
in 2009 is likely to have increased both types of transfers and partly explain some of the
increase from 2009.
3.3 Wealth statistics
An increase in inheritances would be concurrent with an increase in overall wealth. The
National Accounts (Statistics Norway, 2014e) provide aggregate financial wealth statistics
for households’ and non-profit organizations serving households. Gross financial wealth,
the composition of financial assets and debt from 1998 to 2012 are listed in Table 4. The
different assets adding up to total financial wealth are currency and deposits, securities
other than shares, outstanding claims, shares and equity, and other accounts. Debt is
listed in the right column.
The relative change in households’ holdings of financial wealth over the period is listed
in the last row. In real terms, financial wealth increased by 121 percent from 1998 to 2012.
Except from the financial crisis in 2008, the trend is positive. While holdings of all assets
increased, the composition changed. Securities and outstanding claims increased until
2005, and decreased afterwards. Currency and deposits, the assets contributing the most
to total wealth, were steadily increasing. Outstanding claims more than ten-doubled
during the period, despite the downward trend from 2005 to 2011. It is also worth noting
that debt is increasing faster than gross financial wealth.
Real wealth is not usually reported as part of the official National accounts statistics,
but Statistics Norway’s macro model KVARTS use estimated time series for real wealth,
mainly housing wealth. Since housing wealth is a significant part of households’ total
wealth and affects the level of activity through a wealth effect on household consumption,
it is important to understand its development. Table 5 shows total household net wealth
including this estimated measure of real wealth. Housing wealth is increasing by 162
percent, and grows faster than financial wealth. A similar growth in net wealth is pre-
vented by the even faster-growing debt, and overall net wealth rises by 129 percent from
1998 - 2012. Going back to Table 2 we find that aggregate inheritances are more rapidly
increasing than net wealth over the period, resulting in a growing inheritance-wealth ratio.
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Table 5: Household wealth 1998-2012
Gross
financial Real Total Net wealth
wealth wealth debt
Year mill NOK NOK mill mill NOK mill NOK
1998 863863 1454849 976277 1846689
1999 963674 1708355 1028122 2166568
2000 1036458 1837711 1112319 2381275
2001 1061050 1945893 1200381 2401652
2002 1115165 1997069 1298748 2417718
2003 1208546 2051317 1393605 2530303
2004 1351445 2287855 1548931 2823692
2005 1535302 2477689 1723466 3112258
2006 1663467 2870385 1905165 3475908
2007 1781196 3115013 2115985 3746772
2008 1682160 2832819 2173217 3285712
2009 1789779 3133781 2243961 3629241
2010 1815017 3290450 2343191 3790362
2011 1833450 3549192 2486971 3964128
2012 1913414 3806736 2649538 4246055
2012
1998
2,21 2,62 2,71 2,30
Source: Statistics Norway (2014d) and KVARTS, Statistics Norway. All values measured in 2012 prices.
3.4 Wealth statistics – micro data
Wealth statistics based on tax records give a more detailed picture of the distribution of
wealth on different subgroups of the population and thus also on the potential estates.
Statistics Norway’s property account (Statistics Norway, 2014a) shows households’ esti-
mated gross and net wealth based on values of financial capital taken from individual tax
records and the estimated housing values that are used for tax purposes.
Before 2010, Norwegian housing wealth was estimated using the assessed value from
tax returns rather than market value. Previous research reported assessed valuation to
constitute around 20 percent of the real housing value (Thomassen and Melby, 2009). The
geographical differences in gaps between assessed and estimated values were substantial.
In Oslo, housing wealth was assessed as 13 percent of estimated real value. Dwellings in
Hedmark and Oppland, however, were assessed to around 26 – 28 percent of real value. In
Table 6, households’ aggregate estimated gross wealth and net wealth by asset type from
2010 to 2012 are reported. Over these three years, increasing market value of primary
and especially secondary dwellings results in rising housing wealth.
In order to get an idea about the size of potential estates one may combine age-
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specific wealth and age-specific mortality rates. In the first column in Table 7 I have listed
households’ average net wealth for different age groups, found in the wealth statistics. Net
wealth is increasing from year to year for all age groups, and increasing with age except
from the highest age group. Individuals between 67 and 79 years of age are in other words
holding the highest average net wealth. The two next columns in Table 7 report the share
of total population and share of deaths occurring in each age group.
The annual ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living is an important factor
when estimating the inheritance-income ratio using Piketty’s (2011) method. Average net
wealth of the deceased is found by summing over average net wealth multiplied by the
share of deaths in each age group. Likewise, I multiplied average net wealth by the share
of population in each age group and summed over to compute the average wealth of the
living. The resulting ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living is found in
Table 8. For the three years in which I have data the wealth of the deceased is around 90
percent higher than wealth of the living. As the ratio does not seem to follow any trend,
I will in the calculations of the inheritance flow in section 5.3 use the mean ratio listed in
the right column.
Table 8: The ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living
Wealth ratio
2010 2011 2012 mean
Wealth of the deceased/
wealth of the living 1,88 1,90 1,89 1,89
Sources: Statistics Norway (2014a,b and c)
4 Examining inheritance tax planning behavior
According to the estimated ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living we
would expect inheritances to be quite substantial. However, according to Table 2, the
average inheritance is still rather modest and does not seem to increase steadily over
time. One explanation may be that the bequeathed estates lack a substantial amount of
actual wealth transfers if the wealthy are successful at avoiding inheritance tax by tax
planning.
In this section I combine information from the inheritance tax registry in 2010 with
the previous wealth histories of the deceased individuals in 2010. The wealth information
is taken from the registry of tax records.
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4.1 Avoidance opportunities
Before the abolishment of the inheritance tax in 2014, there were different ways to transfer
wealth outside of the gift and inheritance taxation system. One avoidance possibility was
converting assets into non-listed stocks6. While the basis for taxation of listed stocks
and equity was market value at the time of transfer, taxation of non-listed stocks were
based on assessed valuation January 1 the current year. Receivers of non-listed stocks
were also offered a tax discount. Until 01.01.2009, one could choose between letting 30
percent or 100 percent of the assessed value of non-listed stocks make up the tax base.
From 2009, the discount decreased and at least 60 percent of assessed valuation up to
NOK 10 mill went into the tax base. Non-listed stocks with valuation exceeding NOK
10 mill got no discount. Transferring non-listed stocks as inter-vivos or inheritances
therefore substantially reduced the tax liabilities, both due to assessed valuation and the
tax discount, in particular before 2009. In addition, transferring non-listed stocks in a
year with appreciation would create further gains.
By transferring wealth during life, one could also avoid inheritance taxation. As
mentioned previously, annual inter-vivos gifts from one donor to one recipient up to 0.5
G were tax exempt. A married couple with three children and eight grandchildren could
therefore in 2013 each transfer NOK 42 622.57 to each of their children and grandchildren
(or anyone else for that matter) without being subject to taxation. This way, the couple
could legally “get rid of” NOK 937 695 in one year.
Even if it does not represent reducing the estate, spreading wealth on as many indi-
viduals as possible was a third way of reducing the tax base. By juggling wealth transfers
between recipients, donors could make each recipient avoid the next tax threshold. As-
sume that an individual dies in 2010 with values of NOK 40 mill in non-listed stocks. By
splitting this wealth evenly into four inheritances of NOK 10 mill, each of the recipients
got the 40 percent tax discount. Another individual leaves bank deposits and a house
with a total value of NOK 2 mill. If she has two children who each inherits NOK 1 mill,
they both pay nothing on the first NOK 470 000, 6 percent tax on the next NOK 330 000
and 8 percent tax on the last NOK 100 000. The total tax paid on their mother’s estate
is then NOK 55 600. If the estate is spread on three recipients, however, they each inherit
less than NOK 800 000 and will pay no tax on the first NOK 470 000, and 6 percent on
the next NOK 196 667. Total tax paid on the estate is now NOK 35 400. Had she left
equal bequests to four recipients, they would each inherit NOK 500 000. Since only NOK
30 000 per inheritance is tax liable, the total inheritance tax paid would be NOK 7 200.
6Following Skatteetaten (2013).
7From 01.05.2013, the base rate G is NOK 85 245 (Skatteetaten 2014b).
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4.2 Data
My main data source is a combination of the inheritance tax register in 2010 and tax
records for the decedent over the period 2004-2010. Since the inheritance tax is levied
on the recipient, the tax register is organized into one case for each inheritance, instead
of by estate. According to the law of undivided estate, inheritances are given from both
parents at the time of death of the last surviving parent. For instance, if the last surviving
parent of a married couple had two children there will be 4 inheritances, one from each
parent to each child. Furthermore, the register contains information about the kinship
of the recipient, the asset composition of the inheritance and the sum of inter-vivos gifts
received earlier. Here, this information is aggregated up to assess the size, composition
and number of recipients of the whole estate. The asset composition is grouped into:
• Bank deposits
• Funds (stock market and money market funds)
• Outstanding claims (insurance and other claims)
• Stocks (registered in VPS)
• Unlisted stocks (not registered in VPS)
• Vehicles (cars, boats, motorcycles etc)
• Housing8
• Summer homes
• Other real estate (farms, lots, business estate)
• Other assets (other assets and tangible business assets)
• Debt
These asset categories are compared to equivalent asset categories in the decedent’s tax
records in the years 2004-2010. In cases where the donor leaves an undivided estate, the
asset history represents the combined assets of both spouses.
8In the tax records housing wealth is represented by a tax value (ligningsverdi) that is approximately
0,2-0,25 of the market value. Here the tax value is thus multiplied with 4. In the inheritance records this
is usually represented by a modest market value.
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I am interested in finding out if and how individuals avoid the inheritance tax. Since
it seems likely that wealthier individuals have greater incentives to tax plan than the rest
of the population, I separate the top 5 percent wealthiest in 2004 from the rest. The
groups obviously differ in amounts of wealth holdings, but I want to compare them to
see whether there are any differences in the development of asset holdings during the last
period of life that might indicate tax avoidance among the wealthiest.
All tax planning aim to reduce the amount subject to taxation. One major avoidance
opportunity I will look into here is converting assets into non-listed stocks. Even though
this does not reduce the actual estate, I will also see whether richer individuals spread
their wealth on more recipients than the less wealthy and thus reduce their recipients’ tax
base.
4.2.1 Tax avoidance by converting assets
I start by looking at how average net wealth and composition of wealth assets develop in
the two groups over time. First I look at the population not included in the top 5 percent
wealthiest in 2004. In Figure 1, we see that individuals are accumulating wealth until
they die. This is in contradiction to the life-cycle model, which states that individuals
spend the last period of their lives dissaving (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). Since the
increase in net wealth in the first panel is mainly driven by an increase in housing wealth,
I have excluded housing from the second panel to more clearly see the development of
other assets. Without housing wealth there is still a real term increase in net wealth, now
driven by the increase in bank deposits and a reduction in debt. For the top 5 percent
wealthiest we see a different pattern. Net wealth is sharply increasing until 2007 and
starts decreasing in 2008. And there is only one of the wealth components driving this
trend. While housing wealth and bank deposits are both steadily increasing, non-listed
stocks have a high growth in 2005 and an explosive growth in 2006 resulting in a net
wealth peak in 2007. Then, non-listed stocks and net wealth starts declining. Apart from
non-listed stocks the wealth accumulation is steadily increasing until death also among
the wealthiest.
As mentioned above, converting assets into non-listed stocks was a way to reduce
taxable transfers since taxation was based on assessed valuation, and receivers were offered
a tax discount. Before 2009, receivers of non-listed stocks could choose between letting 30
percent and 100 percent of the non-listed stocks assessed value make up the tax base. From
2009, only non-listed stocks up to NOK 10 mill were offered a discount and the discount
was reduced from 70 percent to 40 percent. The incentives to invest in non-listed
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Source: Inheritance tax register 2010 and tax records 2004-2010. All values measured in 2012 prices.
Figure 1: Average net wealth and wealth assets for the bottom 95 per-
cent of the wealth distribution in 2004
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Source: Inheritance tax register 2010 and tax records 2004-2010. All values measured in 2012 prices.
Figure 2: Average net wealth and wealth assets for the top 5 percent
of the wealth distribution in 2004
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stocks were therefore reduced from 2009. The reform was announced October 7. 2008,
implying that tax avoiders could transfer non-listed stocks at the end of 2008 to reduce
tax liabilities. The reduction in non-listed stocks and net wealth the last years before
the wealthiest individuals passed away might indicate tax avoidance through transferring
favorably taxed assets. Any decline in wealth in 2008 is also likely to be related to the
financial crisis, however. It is difficult to say how much of the increase in value of non-
listed stocks before 2008 amongst the wealthy that is due to a conversion into non-listed
stocks for tax planning purposes and how much is merely a result of an economic boom.
Likewise, the declining net wealth in 2008 and 2009 could be a result of recession rather
than distribution of wealth.
Table 9: Ratio of size of asset each year to size of asset in estate, bottom
95 percent in 2004
Year Housing Bank Stocks9 Funds Outstanding Vehicles Other Total net
deposits claims real estate wealth
2004 1,49 2,03 6,98 5,22 0,18 2,46 0,72 1,50
2005 1,5 2,21 4,63 4,31 0,52 2,52 0,69 1,48
2006 1,87 2,42 12,34 6,94 0,29 2,45 0,44 1,72
2007 2,07 2,72 12,04 7,5 0,32 2,46 0,52 1,84
2008 2,24 2,97 17,96 5,38 0,31 2,41 0,55 1,90
2009 2,38 3,18 19,51 6,43 0,27 2,22 0,5 1,97
Source: Inheritance tax register 2010 and tax records 2004-2010. All values measured in 2012 prices.
To further compare changes in wealth composition in the two groups over time, I look
at the size of the most important assets relative to the same assets size in the estate. In
Table 9, the ratios for the less wealthy group are reported. As we saw in Figure 1, housing
and bank deposits are increasing relative to their share in the estates. Funds, outstanding
claims, vehicles and other real estate do not seem to follow any trend. Since both non-
listed and listed stocks are registered as stocks in the estate records, I combine them and
report both as stocks in Table 9 and 10. And it is in stocks that the most interesting
development seems to happen. While being a relatively unimportant share in the less
wealthy group’s wealth composition, the increase in stocks is formidable compared to
other assets. This increase is interesting from an avoidance perspective. If the wealthiest’
downward trend in non-listed stocks in 2008 and 2009 was simply a result of economic
recession, we would expect also the stocks of the less wealthy to decrease in 200810. What
10Ideally one should have performed an analysis on the development in wealth holdings in the years
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happens is the exact opposite - the stocks of the less wealthy increase during the financial
crisis.
Table 10: Ratio of size of asset each year to size of asset in estate, top
5 percent in 2004
Year Housing Bank Stocks11 Funds Outstanding Vehicles Other Total net
deposits claims real estate wealth
2004 0,91 1,09 10,64 3,76 0,81 1,78 0,64 0,77
2005 0,9 1,12 11,3 3,53 1,36 1,85 0,68 0,77
2006 1,12 1,23 24,91 4,98 1,12 1,88 0,6 0,95
2007 1,23 1,37 85,19 5,23 1,07 1,96 0,51 1,53
2008 1,34 1,52 61,59 3,48 1,12 1,94 0,99 1,29
2009 1,46 1,58 47,78 4,36 0,94 1,72 0,61 1,16
Source: Inheritance tax register 2010 and tax records 2004-2010. All values measured in 2012 prices.
Note: both listed and non-listed stocks included.
In Table 10 the development in wealth composition for the wealthiest is reported.
The increase in housing and bank deposits and variation in funds, outstanding claims,
vehicles and other real estate is comparable to that of the less wealthy. Again, what we
are interested in is mainly the development of stocks. As seen in Figure 2, the growth
in stocks is massive from 2004 to 2007. In 2008 and 2009 the trend is reversed, and
stocks are decreasing. The fact that the two groups face opposite trends around the
financial crisis is interesting and might indicate that the fall in non-listed stocks for the
wealthiest from 2008 is a result of tax planning. However, preferences for stocks might
be heterogeneous across groups and the more wealthy individuals might hold stocks more
exposed to recession such that the decline is simply due to a fall in asset prices.
The right column in Table 9 and 10 show total net wealth relative to estate. The less
wealthy experience an increasing ratio: net wealth constituted 150 percent of estate in
1998, 184 percent in 2006 and almost 200 percent in 2012. The wealthiest, on the other
hand, start off with a net wealth that is lower than the size of the estate, peak with a
ratio of 150 in 2007 and declines towards one from 2008. As before, the differing trends
among the groups may indicate tax avoidance among the wealthiest. The total ratio of
net wealth to estate, however, is higher among the less wealthy which could be a result of
substantial tax planning also among this group. Alternatively, the high ratio could also
be due to higher relative costs related to death and the probate process among the less
wealthy. As a cautious measure of tax avoidance, I calculated the sample mean of the
net wealth - estate ratio in my data set. Including both groups, the mean ratio is 1,463.
prior to death for the deceased in many periods to avoid the particular development in one specific period.
This proved to be outside the scope and time frame of this thesis.
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In calculations of the inheritance flow in chapter 5, I will use this ratio to adjust for tax
avoidance.
4.2.2 Reducing the inheritance tax base by spreading wealth
While spreading wealth reduces the tax liability for the recipient, it differs from conversion
of assets by not reducing the size of the estate. It thus represents an adjustment rather
than an avoidance act. By making sure that all recipients receive transfers that are lower
than the tax liable threshold, an individual could avoid inheritance tax on his estate
altogether. Since I only have data on the average number of recipients on each estate and
do not know the size of each inheritance, I look at the average number of inheritances
from each estate for both groups of individuals.
Table 11: Average number of inheritance recipients
Group Average inheritors
Bottom 95 percent in 2004 3,646
Top 5 percent in 2004 5,109
Source: Inheritance tax register 2010 and tax records 2004-2010.
In Table 11 we see that the wealthiest leave bequests to more recipients than the rest
of the population. On average, 5,11 inheritances are received from wealthy individu-
als/households’ estates while the rest of the population spread their estate on 3,65 indi-
viduals. These numbers of inheritances are both quite low, however. If the last surviving
parent in an undivided estate has two children, the estate is divided into four inheritances,
one from each parent to each child. The higher number of average inheritances left by
the wealthiest could thus be a result of a higher share of individuals living in undivided
estates or higher fertility amongst the wealthiest, rather than actual tax planning.
5 Imputing aggregate inheritance as a share of income
5.1 Introduction
According to Piketty and Zucman (2013), wealth-income ratios of the nine largest economies
in the world have been rising gradually over the last four decades, from 200-300 percent
in 1970 to 400-600 percent in 2010. They attribute this increase to the declining economic
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growth in Europe, and explain the trend as follows: Changes in capital policy during the
1900s led to first a decline and then an increase in relative asset prices. Up until World
War I capital markets were freely flowing, but asset prices decreased through the 1970s
after anti-capital policies were put into place. As the regulations were liberated from the
1980s, the asset prices recovered. At the same time as the increase in asset prices, there
has been a slowdown of productivity and population growth. Going back to the r > g
logic from section 2, r has increased and g declined resulting in growing wealth-income
ratios. The high wealth-income ratio strengthens the role of wealth and inherited wealth
in the overall structure of inequality, and is important for future policy-making.
5.2 Method
I have attempted to replicate Piketty’s (2011) exercise of estimating intergenerational
transfers as share of national income in Norway in the period 1998-2012 using data from
Statistics Norway. The basic accounting equation estimating the inheritance flow is the
following:
Bt
Yt
= μt ∗mt ∗ Wt
Yt
There are three factors determining the aggregate size of inheritance as share of na-
tional income. Bt denotes intergenerational transfers and Yt households’ income. µt
measures the ratio between average wealth of the deceased and average wealth of the
living, and Wt
Yt
the households’ wealth - income ratio. mt is the mortality rate. Thus, in-
heritance flow as share of national income is larger the richer the deceased are compared
to the surviving individuals, the higher mortality rate and the higher the private wealth
relative to national income.
The mortality rate is found by simply dividing the number of deaths by the total pop-
ulation each year. The aggregate private net wealth is the sum of households’ financial
wealth and housing wealth as listed in Table 5. The ratio of wealth of the deceased to
wealth of the living, µt, can be estimated in various ways. First, I replicated Piketty’s
method using estate tax data combined with age-wealth profiles and mortality rates to
estimate the ratio (see 3.4 Wealth statistics - micro data). Because of the different treat-
ment of housing values in the tax records, I only got estimates from 2010, 2011 and 2012
(the years in which the data are most reliable). The estimates did not seem to follow any
trend, so I used the mean value of the estimates.
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I also estimated the wealth ratio directly using tax records for some years prior to 2010.
The ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living could be compared in cases
where the tax records included a variable for being deceased (dødsbo). This variable was
present in my data set for the years 1999, 2002 and 2004-2004. However, since a sizeable
part of individuals’ wealth is likely to be spent on expenses or transferred the year they
die, I created a lagged variable that measured wealth of deceased individuals the year
before they die. This way, µt is the ratio of average wealth of individuals passing away
next year to average wealth of individuals surviving next year. As in the case with the
Piketty estimation, µt did not seem to follow any trend so I used the sample mean for
the period. One reason that the ratio is lower using this estimation than the Piketty
estimation is that housing values are more poorly measured prior to 2010. Since housing
is a major component in the net wealth of the deceased, net wealth of the dead is likely
to be substantially underestimated.
5.3 Results
In table 12 below, I have listed the factors determining the inheritance flow. Both estima-
tions of the ratio of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living (denoted wealth ratio)
are reported. The mortality rate is decreasing over the period. Looking at households’
wealth - income ratio, we see that the overall trend is slightly increasing. To find out
what is driving the trend we need to look at the development in households’ net wealth
and income. Figure 3 plots the changes in net wealth, financial wealth, housing wealth
and income from 1998 to 2012. Both wealth and income are increasing, but the rise in
wealth is more rapid than in income. It is important to note that the fact that households’
income is actually increasing over this period distinguishes Norway from many other Eu-
ropean countries. Even if net wealth is increasing, mainly driven by an increase in housing
wealth, the wealth-income ratio in Norway is modest and far from the ratios described by
Piketty and Zucman (2013).
The third factor determining the inheritance flow is the ratio of wealth of the deceased
to wealth of the living, denoted wealth ratio. The two estimated ratios are quite different.
While the wealth register data reports that the deceased on average have lower wealththan
the living, the Piketty estimation yields a wealth ratio of 1,9. While the gap is partly
due to the fact that the Piketty ratio includes a better measure of housing wealth, the
gap might also indicate tax avoidance. If individuals transfer or reclassify wealth in order
to reduce estates (and thus inheritance tax liabilities), tax register data will not give a
correct picture of wealth distribution across age groups. In fact, the decrease in net wealth
from the second highest to highest age group shown in Table 7 could be a result of tax
planning.
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Table 12: Factors determining the inheritance flow
Year Mortality Income Wealth Wealth/ Wealth Wealth
income ratio ratio
mill NOK mill NOK Register data Piketty
1998 0,01 1185445 1842653 1,554 . .
1999 0,01 1220346 2208700 1,81 0,911 .
2000 0,01 1269196 2341730 1,845 0,876 .
2001 0,01 1282111 2398883 1,871 0,9 .
2002 0,01 1363319 2417661 1,773 0,955 .
2003 0,009 1406025 2532052 1,801 . .
2004 0,009 1469057 2838378 1,932 0,963 .
2005 0,009 1555919 3118486 2,004 0,944 .
2006 0,009 1507923 3527633 2,339 . .
2007 0,009 1628193 3727145 2,289 . .
2008 0,009 1707674 3245693 1,901 . .
2009 0,009 1758667 3658464 2,08 . .
2010 0,009 1795055 3807010 2,121 . 1,89
2011 0,008 1883097 3972085 2,109 . 1,90
2012 0,008 1968483 4236190 2,152 . 1,89
2012
1998
0,843 1,661 2,299 1,384
Sources: Statistics Norway (2014a,b,c,d and e) and register data, Statistics Norway. All values
measured in 2012 prices.
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Sources: Housing wealth as estimated in Table 5. Statistics Norway (2014d and e). All values measured
in 2012 prices.
Figure 3: Households’ wealth and income 1998 - 2012
In Table 13 the estimated inheritance flows are reported. Column (1) and (2) show the
Piketty estimations. Inheritance flow (1) is using the wealth ratio from the wealth register
data, while flow (2) is using the wealth ratio estimated by Piketty’s method. Inheritance
flow (3) and (4) are computed by dividing the registered inheritances (3) and the total
inheritances (4) by households’ income. Inheritance flow (5) is based on the same register
data as (4), but adjusted for tax avoidance by scaling flow (4) by 1,463, which is the
measure of tax avoidance found in section 4.2.
Because of the higher estimated wealth ratio, column 2 yields an inheritance flow
between 3 and 4 percent, double as high as column 1. The register data including all
inheritances adjusted for tax avoidance comes next, with estimates ranging from 1,5 to
2,2 percent. The register data including also tax exempt transfers estimates an inheri-
tance flow between 1 and 1,5 percent, whereas the official tax register data reports that
inheritances amount to 1 percent of households’ net income. We see that the Piketty flow
is around three times as high as the flow calculated using the inheritance tax register.
The gap between the Piketty replicated estimation and the official inheritance flows can
be used as an upper bound of tax avoidance, whereas the adjusted flow (5) yields a lower
bound of avoidance.
Common to all estimated inheritance flows plotted in Figure 4 is that they are relatively
stable. The overall increase from 1998 to 2012 is 17 percent using the Piketty estimation.
The slightly decreasing mortality rates offset by an increasing wealth-income ratio and
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a stable wealth ratio result in a flat inheritance flow, at least if we disregard the peak
in 2006-2007. Since the ratios of wealth of the deceased to wealth of the living were
estimated using limited data, there could be an increasing trend in the real wealth ratio
that I have not been able to catch in my data set. In that case, the increase in inheritance
flows should have been higher. In fact, seeing as the growth in the all inheritances register
flows are higher than in the Piketty estimated ones, this is not impossible. The increase
of 48 percent in flow (4) and (5) might indicate that the inheritance flows are increasing.
At the same time, since most of the increase takes place from 2009 one must consider the
possibility that the increase might be driven by the changes in tax rates and thresholds
for tax liabilities that year. The increase in inheritance flows could therefore be driven
by changes in tax reform raising incentives to transfer wealth, rather than representing
a general trend. Since the increase coincide with the financial crisis, however, I cannot
reject the possibility that some of the increase in inheritance flows might be a result of
economic recession.
Table 13: Inheritance flows 1998 - 2012
Year Inheritance Inheritance Inheritance Inheritance Adjusted12
flow (1) flow (2) flow(3) flow (4) flow (5)
Register data Piketty method In.tax register all inheritances all inheritances
1998 0,0144 0,0293 0,009 0,0103 0,0151
1999 0,017 0,0348 0,0086 0,0114 0,0167
2000 0,0168 0,0343 0,0089 0,0113 0,0165
2001 0,0169 0,0345 0,0096 0,0118 0,0173
2002 0,0161 0,0330 0,0097 0,0115 0,0168
2003 0,0155 0,0318 0,0086 0,0108 0,0158
2004 0,0161 0,0329 0,0092 0,011 0,0161
2005 0,0166 0,0339 0,0097 0,0112 0,0164
2006 0,0192 0,0393 0,0098 0,0111 0,0162
2007 0,019 0,0388 0,0111 0,013 0,0190
2008 0,0155 0,0316 0,0082 0,0101 0,0148
2009 0,0166 0,0340 0,0104 0,0133 0,0195
2010 0,0168 0,0342 0,0107 0,014 0,0205
2011 0,0164 0,0335 0,0109 0,0153 0,0224
2012 0,0168 0,0343
2012
1998
1,1677 1,1677 1,2123 1,4826 1,4826
Sources: (1) and (2): All data taken from Table 13. (3): Statistics Norway (2000, 2013 and 2014e). (4):
Register data, Statistics Norway and Statistics Norway (2014e). (5): Inheritance flow (4) scaled up by
1,463. All values measured in 2012 prices.
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Sources: Data from Table 14. All values measured in 2012 prices.
Figure 4: Inheritance flows Norway 1998 - 2012
In section 2.3 I argued that a country like Norway, with a higher growth than most
other European countries, is expected to have a lower inheritance flow. And my above
results seems to confirm this theory. Whereas Piketty estimated the 2008 inheritance
flow in France to be around 15 percent, my replication for Norway yields 3,5 percent.
And while Piketty finds an increasing trend in inheritance flows, my results look stable.
Obviously, I only look at a short-run perspective and cannot say anything about the long-
run development of inheritances in Norway. It will be interesting to see what happens
to inheritance flows now that the inheritance tax is abolished. Over the last 14 years,
however, I cannot seem to find that inheritances are of increasing importance in Norway.
6 Conclusion
Norway seems to be a European outsider, also when it comes to the importance of inheri-
tances. Whereas France and the UK have experienced sharply increasing inheritance flows
over the past decades and are facing ratios of inheritances to national income between 8
and 15 percent, I find that the inheritance flow in Norway from 1998-2012 is stable at a
much lower level. Using the official inheritance tax register, the flow is around 1 percent.
The official inheritance register is not reliable, however. Since only tax liable transfers are
registered, a large amount of inheritances are excluded from the tax records. In addition,
the thresholds for exemptions and tax rates have been altered over the period so that the
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inheritance data from year to year are not comparable. Using register data including also
tax exempt transfers, the inheritance flow increases slightly. Still, as long as tax avoidance
is not taken into account the inheritance-income ratio is underestimated.
Before the inheritance tax was abolished January 1 this year, there were multiple
avoidance opportunities in Norway. By investing in favorably taxed assets, individuals
reduced their estates and thus tax liabilities. Looking at the development of wealth and
wealth assets for individuals during the last years of their lives, I found that net wealth
during this period was higher than the estates they left behind. Taking the sample mean
of the net wealth – estate ratio, I got an estimate of tax avoidance among individuals
dying in 2010. Adjusting the inheritance flow by this estimated tax avoidance resulted in
an inheritance flow between 1,5 and 2 percent. As an upper bound of tax avoidance I also
replicated Piketty’s way of estimating the inheritance-income ratio. Combining a slightly
decreasing mortality rate, an increasing wealth-income ratio and a stable wealth of the
deceased to wealth of the living ratio resulted in a Norwegian inheritance flow around 3,5
percent.
Compared to Piketty and Atkinson, I have looked at the development of inheritances
over a relatively short period. Even if I cannot find any increase in the inheritance flow
over the period 1998-2012, this does not mean that the long-run development is stable.
Applying the r < g logic, an important reason for Norway’s rather unique position in
the European context is that the country has maintained income growth during a period
where most other countries have suffered from a recession. If this growth comes to a halt
or declines, I do not exclude the possibility of increasing inheritance flow also here.
Increasing inheritance flows will have consequences for wealth inequality and public
policy. With an increase in bequeathed wealth the differences between those who inherit
and those who do not inherit will be augmented. The incentive to spread wealth on as
many as possible disappeared with the abolishment of the inheritance tax, and it is natural
to assume that the abolishment will contribute to an increasing concentration of wealth.
An increase in wealth inequality might call for a revaluation of the way we tax wealth and
wealth transfers, and is likely to raise arguments for a reintroduction of the inheritance
tax for equity reasons. At the same time, it seems to be a lot easier to remove a tax than
to reintroduce it. The tax avoidance that has been taking place also clearly reduced the
efficiency of the inheritance tax. Any reassessments of the inheritance tax should take
this into account, and provide a design that leads to less wasteful tax avoidance behavior.
It will be interesting to observe the effects of the abolishment on the development and
composition of wealth during lifetime, and the distribution of wealth both during life and
at death. I am certain that this will be an important topic in the years to come.
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